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Abstract 
Engineering design has a major impact on downstream performance, but is often 
guided, in both procurement and solution type, by intuition rather than a solid science 
base. Engineering is also increasingly collaborative, crossing organisational 
boundaries. However, the long-term close partnerships, as often proposed, are difficult 
to achieve in the context of individual engineering projects. Building on concepts 
related to investments in specific assets, this study describes the underlying 
characteristics of engineering design investments and then prescribes the relational 
investment and contract forms to select them, thereby contributing to our understanding 
of the engineering design and relational investments that can and should be made.  We 
undertook multiple case study research, which is presented in two phases. The 
descriptive phase identifies positive outcomes for solutions based on off-the-shelf 
designs with fixed price mechanisms, for solutions based on adaptive designs with 
target cost mechanisms, and for bespoke solutions contracted either on cost-plus 
mechanisms or, if in bite-sized pieces, on fixed price mechanisms.  Negative 
performance outcomes were found for adaptive solutions with Fixed Price mechanisms. 
A prescriptive phase, yielding a visualized model, then offers guidance for relational 
investments and contract mechanisms that are suitable for different engineering 
designs. Applicability zones and three potential transitions to challenge and guide 
current practice are developed to inform decision making.  
 
Managerial relevance statement  
Complex engineering projects are increasingly collaborative, involving multiple 
organisations, and involve innovative aspects. Sometimes these innovative aspects are 
developed especially for a single customer from fundamental research and development 
activity, whereas other times it may be possible to adapt previous engineering solutions. 
Clients of such projects must establish the conditions for project success through robust 
procurement approaches; on the one hand, contractors will be concerned that the risk 
and reward profile of their contracts is appropriate; on the other,  there is little guidance 
for clients as to how to establish the right approach. Our paper focuses on establishing 
appropriate governance, including contractual forms and relational types, for different 
engineering design categories. This is operationalized through the concept of 
specialized investments. The descriptive model offers insights for practitioners into 
how governance is approached in a number of cases. The final visualized prescriptive 
model offers guidance for decision makers. Using our model, appropriate levels of 
relational investment, as well as a contract mechanism, can be aligned with different 
engineering design categories. Overall, we propose that the model forms an intellectual 
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structure and rationale to form a strategy for appropriate investments, as well as a basis 
for facilitating discussions between clients and contractors.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
Tushman [1] proposed that the engineering management field has evolved towards complex 
contexts where innovation flourishes through intense collaboration between firms, where the 
latter has become a growing feature of contemporary engineering. However, collaborative 
engineering is characterized as more of a ‘practiced art’ than based on disciplined scientific 
rationale [2] and researchers and practitioners from engineering intensive sectors have found 
the types of long-term relationships proposed very difficult to adopt [3, 4]. In addition to this, 
when projects are complex and innovative they are typically addressed by newly formed teams. 
A common dilemma is that participants from inter-organizational groups must form a mutual 
understanding of design at the early stage of the project, but this is typically undertaken without 
the shared understanding accumulated from long-standing relationships [5]. Some engineering 
design work may be based on solutions that are well known, whereas others may be developed 
from first principles, involving significant uncertainty. Depending on the characteristics, 
different approaches, and hence different degrees of investment, for their management may be 
required  [6, 7]. However, Dixon [4] argues that the approach is too often guided by intuition 
without a science base to inform decision making and organizational principles.  
 
Through the development of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), Coase [8] and then 
Williamson [9, 10] helped establish a theoretical understanding of the types of specialized 
investments made in transactions between firms, which act as the basis for relational ties 
through ‘asset specific investments’. These may take the form of, for example, physical, 
people-based, process or technology based investments that are specific to a project or 
relationship, and Williamson asserts that they “have large and systematic organizational 
ramifications” [11] (p 53). However, the types of investments made in different engineering 
design environments, as well as the rationale for those investments, is less well understood. 
For large complex engineering projects, investments may have to be made in resources and 
expertise for adapting existing designs or for the infrastructure to develop novel technological 
solutions for bespoke designs [7].  
 
In order to thrive, buyer-supplier relationships will need nurturing, development and a range 
of direct investments made [12, 13]. Relational investments can take many and varied forms in 
the pursuit of complex engineering solutions. It can refer to, for example, collaborating 
organizations establishing a Joint Venture or a consortia and committing to legal structures and 
requirements of that arrangement [14], or it can involve direct investments made as part of 
strategic relationship initiatives where direct investments are made in a long term relationship 
[12, 13], or it can be interpreted as project specific investments such as integrated or co-located 
teams [15] and alliancing approaches [16]. It is hoped that such investments align the interest 
of the organizations, lead to better processes and problem resolution across interfaces and a 
positive culture, resulting in a ‘relational gain’ in terms of performance outcomes [17].  
 
Williamson [11] also underlined the critical role of contracting systems in safeguarding the 
interest of firms and organizing transactions. This is echoed in further studies of engineering 
management and complex procurement environments, which suggest that contracts influence 
performance outcomes and trust between the parties, as well as relational investment through 
incentivization and risk sharing mechanisms [18-20]. As Williamson highlighted [11], 
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contracting systems are dependent on a complex interplay of transaction requirements, 
including investment characteristics and frequency. Further research proposes that appropriate 
contracts are required, but it is not clear what is appropriate for different engineering design 
scenarios [21]. The above issues are particularly pertinent in construction engineering, where 
prevailing procurement approaches appear to be unable to establish the appropriate conditions 
for success [22]. As has been noted in the construction management literature, there is little 
consensus for the organisation of procurement selection, and there are many potential 
influences on the choice of approach [23]. Systematic evidence to guide decisions is lacking.  
 
Following Dixon [24, 25], we build on the agenda to contribute to scientific rationale and 
knowledge base for the management of engineering design through the development of 
descriptive (relating theoretical concepts to particular engineering design scenarios) and 
prescriptive models (providing guidance on what should be done in a particular situation). Such 
a design based approach has the potential to increase relevance and application potential, as it 
privileges knowledge pertaining to solving field based problems via the linking of problem 
context, potential interventions and potential outcomes [26]. Hence, the aim of this study is to 
describe the underlying characteristics of the engineering design investments undertaken and 
then prescribe the relational investment and contract forms required to maximize the chance 
of project success.  
 
The descriptive and prescriptive models developed are important, as identifying the appropriate 
contracting and relational choices in engineering projects is vital for establishing conditions for 
success, and more guidance is required.  The descriptive model represents the current situation, 
as derived from the case studies, and a structured approach is used to develop a prescriptive 
model, which can be used to guide investment decisions and contractual choices. As noted by 
Denyer [26], such prescriptive models rarely give a complete solution for any given business 
problem, but rather provide crucial inputs in specific areas of focus.  
 
II. Literature review 
Engineering Design and Management 
Vollmar et al. [27, 28] suggest that a number of global forces are increasing the complexity 
and uncertainty related to departments managing engineering designs. Hence, different 
engineering approaches will be required depending on the technical complexity of engineering 
work, as well as the uniqueness and technological novelty involved. Vollmar et al. [28] suggest 
four engineering scenarios: Easy Engineering, exploiting existing standardised designs, Perfect 
Engineering, where the focus is on the delivery of large scale projects, requiring integration of 
existing technological solutions, Pioneer Engineering, where there is a high degree of 
complexity involving implementation of ‘first-of-a-kind’ projects, and Crisis Engineering, 
where there is a need to cope with serious situations. Organisations that operate in design 
intensive engineer-to-order scenarios, for instance in construction, shipbuilding, machinery and 
capital goods, must be vigilant to ensure that there is not an assumption that only the ‘Easy 
Engineering’ scenario exists. Hence, complexity and unexpected events cause considerable 
disruption because the coping mechanisms do not exist via ‘Easy Engineering’ approaches [27, 
29]. 
 
One way in which complexity can be managed is by the introduction of the concept of a 
customer order decoupling point (CODP), which separates the supply chain into two key 
processes that can be categorized as make-to-order (or customer driven processes) and make-
to-stock (or speculative processes) [30]. Engineering processes can be subjected to the same 
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logic, where some engineering activities are customer driven, and others are speculative [31]. 
This logic has been extended to develop a continuum of engineering design subclasses, where 
solutions may be developed from a very uncertain situation where a significant degree of 
innovative or customer specific engineering work are required, even to the point that new 
scientific principles, engineering testing, or new industry codes and standards must be 
developed for a specific client. At the other end of the continuum, existing designs can be used 
as a basis of a project solution with little adaptation or novelty [7]. A key idea advanced in this 
work is that the client or customer can engage with engineering design activities at different 
points in the process, resulting in different customisation and risk profiles.   
Three broad categories of engineering design emerge: • ’Off-the-shelf’ designs - take existing designs, drawings and subsystems as the starting 
point for the completion of engineering designs. Here we may find innovative 
reconfiguration of mainstream products, so parts of established designs (e.g. CAD drawings 
or product libraries) could be exploited to produce new customer driven adaptations. The 
primary risk in this category is of unsuitable customisation of existing designs [31]. • Adaptive designs – such engineering designs require either the creation or modification of 
codes and standards for a particular customer order, as well as those that develop novel 
designs which take such codes and standards as the starting point. Many complex civil and 
structural engineering schemes occupy this space, where innovative technical solutions 
must interact with International or National Standards, as well as codes developed by 
communities of practice. These have much in common with the technology standards 
explained in Narayanan and Chen [32]. The risk here is that adapting codes and standards 
will be very resource intensive and complex, if there are many interacting standards. 
Designs are developed on an individual basis from a ‘blank sheet’, or more precisely a set 
of codes and standards. Hence, the nature of innovation is in developing solutions that do 
not take existing designs as the starting point. • Bespoke designs - research and development activities conducted ‘to order’ for the client 
in the development of engineering designs. Examples include customer specific scientific 
equipment development based on non-established principles, material science testing or 
engineering testing. There is a risk in this category that the proposed solution may not 
perform as intended, as the innovation is unique and unproven. Due to the high levels of 
uncertainty in co-operations in this domain, exchanges and contracts may be established 
under different principles [33]. 
 
Engineering and construction related industries have traditionally found relationships and 
partnering challenging to adopt in a formal sense, since projects have been seen as one-time 
transactions [34]. However, there is evidence of change, and academic models, as well as 
critique, have helped to specify how relational forms can be applied to engineering projects, 
either through strategic partnering arrangements across the supply base or through project 
partnering approaches [15, 17, 35], or through alliancing and collaborative procurement [16].  
 
In order to reduce the adversarial conditions associated with traditional construction 
procurement, collaborative forms of procurement have been proposed to incentivize co-
operation. For example,  it may be possible to encourage early involvement of project team 
members through the procurement process, and also to establish risk sharing models where 
costs and benefits are shared jointly [22]. Principles of collaborative procurement can also be 
observed in alliancing, where mechanisms are put in place to align all project members [36], 
as well as integrated project delivery where there is a contractual agreement between many 
parties [15]. However, Thompson et al. [37] argue that relationships and contracts and 
relationships must be fit for purpose, but they note that there is little guidance for what is 
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appropriate in different business conditions. Further, the evidence base for making these 
decisions is often piecemeal and anecdotal.   
 
The choices for relational and contractual forms require an understanding of the project 
preconditions that influence procurement routes. A recent examination of formal contracts and 
relational governance argues that the interplay remains critical to performance, but suggest that 
choices are moderated by many institutional and contextual factors, which need to be more 
fully understood [38]. These could be the level of client experience and expertise, for example 
in their ability to articulate needs and requirements, as well as ability to control and manage 
projects [23].  Project characteristics, such as timing, complexity and risk have also been 
proposed as important influences [18, 21]. A key determinant is also the design solution and 
the associated uncertainty [7, 22]. As can be seen, a wide range of factors may affect 
procurement choice and no easy consensus exists to use as a basis for decision making [23].  
 
To enable project partnering approaches, a key competence for engineering organisations is the 
development of a formalised and structured approach to configuring and managing the supply 
base [39]. This will involve a range of relationship types, including strategic relationships or 
very loose arms-length style relationships, high or low levels of trust, and norms that support 
the exchange, or alternatively, those that are more transactional [40]. More sophisticated firms 
will use a portfolio approach to structure the supply base so that different investments and 
approaches can be configured across a range of relational types [39]. The supplier development 
literature has begun to document efforts and investments made by industrial buying firms to 
improve the capability of its suppliers through different initiatives [12, 13].  
 
Direct investments to improve suppliers may take many forms, including capital and equipment 
investments, financial investment, provision of human and organizational resources, and 
operational knowledge transfer activities [12, 13]. The reality for many engineering firms is 
that direct investment is only possible with a selection of close strategic partners but with less 
investment, or at least different types of investment, in looser relational categories [39]. This 
is linked with a well-developed premise in the literature that as the service provision and 
complexity of an exchange increases, for instance in the pursuit of an innovative solution, the 
intimacy between the parties should increase as firms become very interlinked [41, 42]. Hence, 
in a supply chain context the relationship type, from close to loose, can depend on the degree 
of alignment required for joint innovation [43], and a contingency approach is recommended 
[44].  
 
Finally, at the project level, newer relational forms of contract have also started to blur the 
boundaries of contractual and relational in engineering work [36].  Contracts are a ubiquitous 
part of large complex engineering projects [20]. Due to the specialisations required, and scale 
and scope of such projects, work is typically broken down into work packages and contracted 
by a client. This in turn will yield levels of subcontracting. Researchers have argued that it is 
important to find the right contract in relation to the levels of uncertainty and investment 
characteristics of a project [18, 20, 21]. The fundamental way in which risk and incentives can 
be allocated by the contract is through financial mechanisms devised at the procurement stage 
[18, 19, 21]. Commonly used mechanisms, which form the basis for discourse for the 
contractual approach in industry settings in terms of the contract form, include a fixed fee at 
one end of the scale to a cost-plus model at the other [45]. Incentive schemes sit in the middle 
of this continuum, where employer and contractor share costs and profits according to a 
predefined rule or a collectively agreed target cost [46].  
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Transaction Cost Economics and Asset Specific Investments   
TCE is primarily focused on overcoming the risks associated with opportunistic behaviours 
between a buyer and seller through the use of contractual arrangements. The theory is best 
known through the work of Coase [8] and Williamson [9-11]. TCE models the firm as a set of 
transactions, each of which can be conducted either in the market or by being internalized by 
the firm. Transaction costs represent the costs of undertaking an exchange that may occur for 
example between firms or within a supply chain. Three key factors are identified that impact 
on transactions: the presence of uncertainty, transaction frequency (one-time, occasional, and 
recurrent) and the specificity of the asset subject to exchange (non-specific, mixed, and highly 
specific or idiosyncratic) [11] (p. 79). Building on the previous phases of the literature review, 
we mobilize concepts to classify the degree of investment in engineering design (‘off-the-
shelf’, adaptive and bespoke) and the relational linkages developed as a result of specific 
investments.   
 
Asset specificity has emerged as a core concept in TCE, and is highlighted as the principal 
factor affecting transactions [47]. Investments in assets may be non-specific and re-deployable, 
or they may be specific to a transaction so that they cannot be redeployed elsewhere. 
Williamson [11] (p.95) defines this as “the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to 
alternative uses by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value.” Since then, asset 
specificity has been interpreted in many different ways. De Vita et al.  [48] categorize research 
using asset specificity and find that it has been interpreted in a number of ways, emphasizing, 
for instance, the degree of customization needed to support the transactional relationship or the 
value embedded in the continuance of the relationship. Williamson [10] (p. 526) distinguished 
site specificity (located ‘cheek-by-jowl’ to economize), physical asset specificity (e.g. 
specialised plant), human asset specificity (e.g. lessons learned) and dedicated asset specificity 
(e.g. investment in plant). In the context of our study, we are particularly interested in the 
specific types of investment made to support different types of engineering design. For 
example, when bespoke designs are developed, investments may need to be made in 
understanding requirements, analysing potential solution options and innovations, and 
mobilising resources to support these activities. 
 
The specialized investments in assets of the types outlined above represent both a problem and 
an opportunity. In terms of the problem areas, specific investments create bilateral dependency 
or ‘lock in’, leading to potential contracting hazards such as opportunism by one of the parties 
in the transaction [47]. However, it can offer opportunities to be a source of uniqueness and 
competitive advantage, helping to offer customized services and solutions [49]. The challenge 
is to design and manage appropriate governance structures and relationships, based on the 
investment characteristics, to mitigate the problems and maximise the opportunities. In the 
construction engineering and management literature TCE has been interpreted and 
characterised in a number of different ways. Winch [50] notes that in the early phase of 
engineering projects, uncertainty is high but post-contract asset specificity is low for example 
in the supply of design and engineering services. For the later phases of a project, uncertainty 
tends to be lower, but post-contract asset specificity tends to be a lot higher due to the costs 
associated with replacing a contractor mid-way through the execution phase of a project.  
 
III. Research Methods 
Research Design and Setting 
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Dixon [24, 25] identifies the importance of descriptive and prescriptive models in developing 
scientific theory with respect to engineering design. Descriptive theory relates meaningful 
theoretical or knowledge-based constructs to particular design engineering environments, 
whereas prescriptive models seek to guide researchers and practitioners as to what should be 
done in a given environment. The logic of prescription can be seen as “offering a general 
template for the creation of solutions” [26], but this will often involve describing and 
understanding the generative mechanisms in detail first. The overall aims of such an approach 
are to answer ‘how should things be?’ (i.e. prescriptive knowledge), to build a ‘design-oriented 
synthesis’ to develop ideas on interventions, and to validate knowledge on pragmatic means to 
demonstrate how the knowledge may contribute to solving field problems [26]. 
 
The process of moving from descriptive to prescriptive models has been characterised by 
‘means-end analysis’ [51]. Here, solution development and synthesis of concepts, 
representations of present states and desired states, understanding of generative mechanisms 
and potential outcomes, practical uses, as well as effectiveness of the design solution, all 
proceed through iterations and refinements [26, 51]. The approach is especially useful for 
creating practical knowledge for a challenging problem domain (in our case, determining the 
appropriate relational and contractual forms), and the design approach is not limited to physical 
artefacts, but also a wide range of design outputs such as guidelines, conceptual models, 
propositions, and rules [52]. In our study, the descriptive phase provided insights from the 
application domain to better understand assumptions, explain realities, as well as develop 
definitions and a work-in-progress framework.   
 
We build on the above approach, developing firstly, from an extensive range of case studies, a 
descriptive model, and then, secondly, a prescriptive model of relational investments and 
contract forms for different engineering design investments. The overall design is visualized in 
Figure 1. It is also possible to see in figure 1 the nature of evaluation and iterations between 
models. The nature of evaluation moves from formative evaluation, feeding into the final 
models, to summative (as per [52]), and from describing the situation (i.e. descriptive) to 
developing solution guidelines (i.e. prescriptive). This iterative process involved the 
development of visualised models to guide prescriptions, whereby propositions are tentatively 
developed, and the potential consequences of prescriptions are evaluated via formative 
feedback and ongoing dialogue with practitioners. 
 
The final summative evaluation concerns the potential effectiveness of the prescriptive model 
in use. Hence, alpha testing was conducted with case study participant interviewees along the 
research journey, and beta testing was conducted once the model reached a point of reasonable 
wholeness and completeness. The beta testing consisted, firstly, of 2 interviews, gathering 
feedback from a commercial director of a large main contractor and then a procurement 
consultant with over 30 years experience as a client procuring major projects. Secondly, the 
model was presented at 2 dissemination events (approximately 30 and then 100 industry 
participants).   
 
Case studies should be selected with a good sense of purpose, appropriate to the aims of the 
study, and to best illuminate the phenomena under scrutiny [53]. Since our aim was to 
investigate the characteristics of investments in relationships and engineering design of 
complex projects, our multiple case study approach sought to include examples that illuminate 
different types of engineering design categories, as well as give insight into the relational and 
contract dimensions. This aligns with Seawright and Gerring’s [54] suggestion to seek “useful 
variation on dimensions of theoretical interest”. Our priority was to ensure coverage of the 
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different engineering design categories (i.e. bespoke, adaptive and off the shelf), probe the 
types of relational investments made, and determine the appropriate contractual forms. 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of research design 
 
 
The infrastructure sector is well placed for such exploration, as it offers a diverse and very 
complex range of case scenarios to study. The primary focus was on the engineering aspects, 
as performance outcomes are typically inhibited more by engineering design outcomes rather 
than manufacturing constraints [55, 56]. In addition, the sector has been slowly transforming, 
and programmes of reform have been encouraged to support longer term relationships and 
better governance [57]. Empirical investigation of relational and contractual interactions are 
best studied from the perspective of a dyadic relationship [58]. Hence, we sought to include 
these guidelines into our research design by gathering interview data from buyer and supplier. 
Case selection was purposively focused on, firstly, studying interesting complex engineering 
situations and their fit across theoretical engineering design dimensions of bespoke, adaptive 
and off the shelf engineering designs, and secondly, ability to obtain dyadic data and 
performance data in the public domain. 
 
Case Study Research Methods, Protocol and Analysis 
 
The case studies cover a wide range of complex engineering projects as summarised in Table 
1, which also shows approximate values and duration of each project. A wide range of people 
were interviewed to inform the study, and these are also indicated in Table 1. For our 
interviewees, we sought senior people with deep knowledge of a particular exchange. We 
aimed to interview those who were involved in a particular contractual or relational 
procurement environment for (e.g. procurement directors, contract managers), technical 
experts to give insight into engineering designs (e.g. Chief Engineer), and more general 
managers or project managers. The key criteria were the extent to which an interviewee would 
be able to give insight into contractual and relational processes, as well as engineering 
processes.  Interviews lasted approximately 1-2 hours but were longer if a tour of a site was 
included.  
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Project Description Value Duration / Phase 
/ Site Tour 
Position of Interviewees 
A Aggregates and 
Materials for Road 
Schemes  
£1.5bn 
(Whole 
Programme) 
5 Years/ Mid 
project 
Supply Chain Manager 
(Client) 
Programme Manager (Main 
Contractor)  
Account Manager 
(Subcontractor) 
B BEBO® style Bridge £90m 2 years / 
Complete / Site 
tour and Tour of 
Engineering 
Office 
Procurement Director (Client) 
Technical Manager (Main 
Contractor) 
C Wind Energy Towers £20m 2 years / 
Complete / Tour 
of 
Manufacturing 
Facility and 
Engineering 
office 
Operations Director (Main 
Contractor) 
D Motorway 
Improvement Project 
£148m 2 years / 
Complete / Site 
Tour 
 Supplier Development 
(Client) 
Project Manager (Main 
Contractor) 
E Smart Motorways 
Scheme 
£300m 4 years / 
Mid Project  
 Major Projects Manager 
(Client) 
Programme Manager (Main 
Contractor) 
F Viaduct 1 £150m 6 years / 
Complete 
Procurement Director (Client) 
Performance Improvement 
Manager (Main Contractor) G Viaduct 3 £90m 3 years / 
Complete 
H Railway Station 
Upgrade  
£250m 4 years /  
Mid Project / 
Site Tour  
Chief Engineer (Client) 
Project Manager (Main 
Contractor) 
I Major Rail Hub  
 
£1bn 5 years /  
Mid Project / 
Site Tour 
Chief Engineer (Client) 
Commercial Director, 
Contract Manager (Main 
Contractor) 
J Rail Tunnelling  £1.25bn Mid Project / 
Tour of Project 
Office 
Chief Engineer (Client) 
Technical Director (Main 
contractor) 
K Intelligent Concrete 
Trial 
£1.6m 3 years / Mid 
Project / Tour of 
lab equipment  
Principal Investigator 
(Contractor) 
L Mirror Segments £5m 5-10 years / Mid 
Project / Tour of 
Consortium Manager 
(Client/Contractor)   
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Manufacturing 
Facility 
Company Director 
(Technology Supplier) 
M Rail Electrification 
Scheme 
£500m 3 years / Early 
Stage 
 Commercial Manager, 
Contract Manager (Main 
Contractor) 
 
Table 1: Overview of Case Studies   
 
Interviews followed a semi-structured protocol as shown in Table 2. The protocol proceeded 
through six stages, moving from more general introductions, to engineering design 
characteristics, and then discussions of the specific types of investment, contracts and 
governance, through to discussion of the performance implications. In addition to the 
interviews, guided site tours were included, which are indicated on the table. Interviews and 
tours were followed up with email validation of notes and key ideas discussed. For each case, 
a number of related documentary sources of information were sought. First, news and media 
releases which were in the public domain were reviewed. In particular, those that commented 
on project performance were of interest (e.g. time or cost). Second, in internal documents, such 
as project descriptions, project case studies written by companies, as well as project summaries 
were reviewed. These often gave information regarding technical/engineering design aspects.  
 
Stage  Key topics and questions 
Stage 1 – Establish Scope 
and Purpose 
• General introductions and presentation • Agree an area to focus the discussion on 
Stage 2 – Identify 
Engineering Design 
Category  
 
• Key characteristics of engineering designs? Risks? • Nature of bespoke engineering work? • Nature of exchange relationship, and joint working 
on the engineering solution developed? 
Stage 3 – Discussion of 
Relational Investments 
• Exchange Partners? Relational initiatives in place? 
Type of linkages? • What investments have been made by the parties? • Recognised partnering, collaborative, alliancing 
forms? 
Stage 4 – Discussion of 
Contracts 
• Relational Structures? Informal ways of working? • Legal structure of relationships and contract form 
used? • Payment mechanisms and risk allocation within 
contract? 
Stage 5 – Site Tour and 
follow up, including 
assessment of performance 
outcomes  
 
• Summarise key points and give opportunity for 
further comment and clarification. • Interactions between relational and contractual 
arrangements, as well as impact on behaviour and 
performance? 
Stage 6 – Coding, Analysis 
and Sense making  
• Coding of different types of engineering design and 
associated characteristics. • Coding of relational investments. • Visualisation through models. 
 
Table 2: Research Protocol   
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While success in projects is often seen as a difficult metric to fully quantify [59, 60] many 
revert to the so-called 'iron triangle', of time, cost and quality [61]. Absolute measures are not 
always easy to exploit for comparative purposes given the varying types, sizes and complexity 
of projects. Hence, in our cases, we have assessed the time variation, which is the difference 
between the actual and contracted timescale, and any cost overrun or underrun [59]. We 
determined if a project ran to time and budget by accessing either public domain data, given 
that a number of projects involved publicly funded infrastructure, and / or the project teams' 
own archived documents. Quality, whether as an absolute or relative performance measure is 
often associated with intangible perceptions as well as quantifiable attributes [62]. For our case 
studies we have exploited participant satisfaction as a proxy for overall quality, seen as an 
emergent property of a project as a whole system [79], based on interviewees satisfaction 
levels. Participants' satisfaction is a measure often exploited in recent research on construction 
performance [63] as it takes a whole systems perspective that is often difficult to quantify. This 
issue was explicitly addressed in stage 5 of the research protocol, where we asked ‘How did 
the project perform and how did the relational and contractual conditions affect the 
performance of the project’. The case evidence was evaluated and analysed via regular reviews 
and debriefing sessions were undertaken by the co-author team. Cases were coded based on 
the characteristics of engineering design, as well as the characteristics of the relational 
investments. The contract types and form were also classified.  
 
IV. Results and Analysis 
Investment characteristics for different engineering design categories 
Figure 2 provides an analysis and synthesis of the main investment characteristics for different 
engineering designs. They have been organized according to Asset Specificity concepts, as 
well as the engineering design categories established through the literature review. For brevity, 
figure 2 highlights the key investments that support the transaction.    
 
Figure 2: Synthesis of Investment Characteristics for different Engineering Design Solutions 
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For the ‘off-the-shelf’ solution category, which includes cases A, B and C, cases are 
characterised by commitments to longer-term supply arrangements, and the investments 
required to facilitate such relational time horizons.  Case A refers to the supply of Aggregates 
and Materials for Road Schemes. Specific investments include commitments and 
administration costs relating to long-term supply arrangements through the category 
management framework, such as prices, amounts, and particular contractual provisions.  Case 
B refers to a BEBO® Bridge Concrete Arch System standard design, which articulates 
construction standards and procedures to follow, including fabrication, handling and 
transportation, construction and installation, backfilling and inspection. Investments include 
technical teams, licensing fees, as well as commitments to manufacture pre-cast elements. Case 
C relates to the design of wind turbine towers. Designs are standard, meeting international 
guidelines and quality accreditation criteria, but are manufactured to order with no speculative 
stockholding. Investments include long term commitments to manufacturing capacity. 
 
The adaptive engineering design solutions category includes cases D to J. Cases D and E relate 
to road infrastructure, where Case D refers to a Motorway Improvement Project near London 
and Case E is a ‘Smart Motorway’ scheme, which is being installed in various parts of the UK. 
The latter employs modern technology to manage, monitor, and increase the safety and 
reliability of journeys. The collaborative structure constitutes a Joint Venture, which includes 
specific employees and resources.  This involves either new infrastructure, or significant 
upgrading of existing assets, and is procured under a Collaborative Delivery Framework, which 
has a longer-term focus with programme rather than project incentives.  
 
Cases F and G are viaduct schemes. Both projects are large and complex, involving significant 
engineering work, including updating, strengthening and structural testing. Cases H, I and J are 
linked to the rail sector. Case H is a redevelopment of a major London station, including a new 
ticket hall, extended platforms and integration of existing lines and routes. Case I is a further 
station development project. To support the relationship, a formal partnership agreement 
developed with articulation of collaborative principles. This included alignment mechanisms, 
incentive payments, interface management protocols, and problem resolution. For the 
remodelling and redevelopment of a station, which is increasing passenger capacity through 
the station from approximately 50 million to 75 million per year. Case J refers to the tunnelling 
contracts for a major engineering programme to extend the underground infrastructure in 
London. The broader programme of work is managed as a Special Purpose Vehicle established 
by client, which includes framework mechanisms to encourage collaboration, training 
schemes, a structured innovation programme and specialist IT systems to support the project. 
Bespoke engineering design solutions are characterised in cases K, L and M. Case K documents 
the developing of the use of intelligent concrete through real world trials of different concrete 
healing technologies in collaboration with an industrial partner. Case L refers to a next 
generation manufacturing technology feasibility study for large scale optics. The project, to 
provide seven segments for a large-scale telescope, makes use of a new process, and new 
developments in nanotechnology, so that the surface of each segment is polished to an 
extremely well defined profile within close tolerances. Case M relates to a special purpose joint 
venture was employed to manage the electrification of a section of rail infrastructure. 
A descriptive model: categorizing cases, practices and outcomes 
Figure 3 plots the cases onto a descriptive model. Building on the concepts established in the 
literature review, and the characteristics explained in the previous section, it brings together 
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the design engineering category (i.e. the extent to which customer specific designs are 
developed) and the extent of specific relational investments made in the exchange 
(characterized as loose, moderate or close linkages between the organisations in the exchange). 
It also includes key elements of governance, including whether it is a recurrent or a single 
transaction and the type of contract payment mechanism used, as indicated in the key.  
 
As shown in Figure 3, Cases A, C, E, J, and M are Recurrent transactions, where there are 
multiple transactions as part of the exchange, such as ongoing supply arrangements or multiple 
installations. All other cases are one-off projects, albeit some of which are projects of 
considerable complexity, value and duration. In the existing design category, Cases A and B 
display a greater degree of relational linkages. Both were linked via joint commitment to 
longer-term programmes of work, whereas Case C relates to a single transaction. In addition, 
cases A, B and C all used priced contracting mechanisms. In the solutions from adaptive 
engineering designs category, many of the exchanges had a relatively high degree of relational 
interlinkages. This reflects the sheer scale and complexity of some of the projects, and the 
investment that accompanies them. Cases J, E and I, in particular, displayed high levels of 
relational linkage. Cases G, D, H, I, E and J employed target cost mechanisms, whereas Case 
F was procured using a priced contract. In case G, the approach resulted in an open and honest 
culture regarding the commercial aspects of the contract…with partners fully engaged as an 
integrated team” (Performance Improvement Manager). In the bespoke solutions category, 
case K displays a transactional approach with very little linking of the organisations in the 
contract. Cases L and M had much higher levels of linkage through a Joint Venture and 
consortia structures. Case M initially employed a cost/time reimbursement contract, whereas L 
and K used priced mechanisms.  
 
Figure 3: Descriptive model showing investment characteristics    
 
The characteristics of Cases M and F altered significantly over time. Case F, a viaduct project, 
was initiated using a Fixed Price mechanism. However, problems with unforeseen conditions 
in the existing infrastructure led to increasing complexity of the engineering work. A Target 
Cost solution was developed and a ‘partnering charter’ was signed mid-way through the project 
to commit the different parties to joint working, hence increasing the level of relational 
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investment. For the rail electrification project (Case M), the project began on a time and cost 
reimbursement basis. This later transitioned towards a target cost once greater technical 
certainty was established. Geological conditions, including consent, access and planning, all 
contributed considerably to uncertainty and complexity during the early phases of the project, 
as stated by the Contract Manager “we developed detailed risk identification and mitigation 
plans, but these were difficult to assess and formalise, and discussions in this area had to be 
very sensitively handled”. 
 
In Case I, the project coalition started by working under a cost reimbursement plus fee 
structure, and moved to a bespoke target cost contract with gain sharing agreements, where 
profit is shared in an agreed portion above a specified target. To align the different parties and 
contracts, ‘gives and gets’ clauses were used, where incentive payments were stipulated for 
shared dates. These were in the form of Conditional Partnering milestones, and if collaborative 
milestones were met by delivery partners, a payment was made. Additional payments were 
made for partnering milestones to facilitate joined up thinking and objectives between delivery 
partners.  
 
Figure 3 also gives indicators for the performance outcomes of the governance approach for 
the cases at the time of the data collection. Performance outcomes for off-the-shelf solutions 
are best described ‘as planned’. Aside from Case F, other projects in the adaptive design 
category projects either exceeded performance expectations or were as planned. In Case F, 
“Difficulties with technical changes and the form of contract led to a managerial focus being 
drawn towards time consuming contractual issues” (Performance Improvement Manager). 
Whereas for Case I, the commercial director stated “It is important to understand the 
capabilities of the client and the contractor, as well as the depth of relationships and 
entanglement of people and processes within the governance structure. Relationship is the most 
important dynamic for solving problems”.  For bespoke engineering designs, Cases K and L 
had largely positive performance outcomes, whereas Case M was negative.  
Towards a prescriptive model for different engineering designs  
Figure 4 provides a prescriptive model to help guide decision making for different types of 
engineering design. It gives guidance frontiers for appropriate contract types in different 
interaction zones of the model, as well as highlighting potential transitions. Positioned at the 
bottom left of the model, off-the-shelf engineering designs are developed and there is a 
relatively low level of relational investment. The joint commitment to innovation in 
engineering design is low, since there will be some form of off-the-shelf solution. Hence, a 
Fixed Price payment mechanism is appropriate in this scenario, and our analysis indicates that 
this approach leads to as planned performance outcomes, but only if there is certainty of 
requirements, expectations, operating environment and scope. This zone of the model is 
suitable for ‘occasional supply contracts’, where there is no longer term intent and uncertain 
prospects of future requirements. 
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Figure 4: Prescriptive model showing investment characteristics and appropriate contract 
mechanisms 
 
Situated at the top left of the model, solutions are still off-the-shelf, but here there may be a 
very long programme of work or set of recurring requirements, possibly over many years, 
hence, much more suitable for ‘Long term supply contracts’ or strategic partnering arrangement 
(as per [39]). While investment in engineering designs is low, the relational linkages will need 
to be high due to the longitudinal commitment. Fixed Price payment mechanisms may be 
appropriate here, but likely governed by an overarching framework agreement. Bespoke 
agreements may be needed to account for the characteristics of each long-term relationship. 
Occupying the middle ground, adaptive designs interact with increasing investments in the 
relationship due to the complexity of projects. Target cost contracts, where the risks are shared 
between the parties, are more appropriate for this category, since scope may be difficult to 
determine at the outset. Hence, if a contractor must apply or integrate codes and standards as 
per adaptive engineering designs as a basis for an original design in order to arrive at the project 
solution, our empirical work indicates that a target cost payment mechanism will increase the 
likelihood of positive performance outcomes. Joint commitment may take the form of 
partnering charters, co-location, or joint ventures and special purpose vehicles for larger 
projects. Many ‘major project governance’ and project partnering approaches (e.g. [15])  may 
be positioned in this zone of the model. 
Located at the top right of the model, bespoke solutions from research are developed, and large 
relational commitments are required to allow innovation to prosper. A reimbursement contract 
is more appropriate here. Consortia or Joint Ventures will likely be required to bring together 
the expertise and joint commitment to innovation. Hence, this is much more characteristics of 
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the ‘pioneer projects’ described by Vollmar et al. [27, 28].  Situated at the bottom right of the 
model, bespoke solutions are developed but with lower relational linkages. In this category, 
novel work is likely to be packaged into a clearly scoped and manageable chunks of work, 
moving the area of endeavour towards its eventual endpoint in a series of discrete steps, any 
one of which will have limited consequences if it failed. Hence, the approach resembles ‘bite 
size research and development’. A Fixed Price payment mechanism can be used in this 
category, although a bespoke arrangement may have to be considered depending on the needs 
of each bite size project.  
The prescriptive model also identifies a number of potential transitions, which are identified 
via the arrows in Figure 4. The transitions challenge some typical industry practices, and it is 
envisaged that clients and contractors can create mechanisms to support these transitions as 
projects, programmes and requirements progress and become clearer. The proposed transitions 
can also guide potential two-stage contract designs. Transition 1 relates to off-the-shelf 
engineering designs. It begins with a loose linkage but moves the approach towards much 
closer relational linkages. This may be initiated due to a recognition of the strategic importance 
of a relationship, for example. as a result of very frequent need or rarity of the goods and 
services. This challenges the dominant logic across the construction industry, as noted in the 
literature review, for short term loose, transactional approaches. Where high volumes or regular 
demand can be stimulated, clients and contactors are encouraged to develop strategic partnering 
programmes to introduce stability and consistency to relational arrangements.   
Transition 2 begins in the cost reimbursable zone, along with close linkages and bespoke 
engineering designs. However, as design factors become more certain and project environment 
is more settled, it may be appropriate to transition towards a target cost contract, along with 
more adaptive mode of design (as in case study M). This represents a more ‘evolutionary’ 
approach, allowing for more flexibility as project requirements unfold. Transition 3 charts a 
potential route from the same starting point as Transition 2, but follows a different trajectory. 
If the uncertainty and innovation is such that Transition 2 is not feasible, an alternative 
approach would be to split the bespoke solutions into small bite size chunks to be managed as 
a series of Priced contracts. This approach requires careful management, since discrete 
contracts will have to be scoped and delivered in line with a broader goal.  Hence, good client 
capability and management of interfaces between contracts will be required, as well as the 
ability to articulate clear requirements and objectives for discrete bundles of work. 
Building on the Beta testing, we conclude with table 3, which shows an evaluation of the 
implications for practice, strengths and weaknesses of the model. Based on this, we suggest 
that the model can be a starting point for client and contractor to open discussions about the 
type of engineering work to be undertaken and the potential choices to be made, particularly if 
there is an inexperienced client. 
 
Source Feedback  Implications / Strengths / 
Weaknesses 
Interview 1 “The model does focus on key themes, and 
I have not seen it represented in this 
way….it helps to break the illusion that 
fixed price is the answer” 
“the overall procurement strategy relies on 
the interaction between a wide range of 
factors..…it’s very difficult to rationalise 
-Challenges the one-size-fits all approach 
to lump sum contracts, and gives new and 
different way of looking at procurement. 
-Helps to guide choices, particularly for 
those who are inexperienced. 
-There is a need to reflect more on when/ 
and where in the procurement process the 
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this into a comprehensive logical model, as 
deep contextual knowledge is required”. 
model fits, and how the broader drivers of 
procurement approach are accounted for.  
Interview 2 “The model provides a useful structure for 
governance or strategy document for 
clients” 
 “There is a need to consider the client 
preparation that comes before the main 
procurement decision: development of 
requirements, vision, outcomes, 
specifications, knowledge needed”  
“Clients often overestimate their abilities to 
undertake true collaboration”  
-Useful theoretical foundation for decision 
making, which can form the basis for 
formalising client approaches. 
- Helps to consider realities of partnering 
and the investment required. 
-There is a need to reflect more on the 
position of the client prior to the main 
procurement decision. 
Dissemination 
Events 
Example comments: “The model might be 
interpreted differently if you were a one off 
vs a repeat clients”...“Transition 2 is very 
similar to the ECI approach, where a 
contractor is involved early and then shifts 
into a different approach”...”the Oil and 
Gas industry suffers from similar 
challenges”  
-There is a need for organisations 
contextualise the model for their purposes, 
situation and drivers. Some areas of 
prescription are recognised as valid 
approaches.  
-The model may be applicable in different 
engineering sectors, but further testing is 
required.  
 
Table 3: Beta testing and evaluation by experienced practitioners   
 
The prescriptive model indicates the implications of customer penetration concepts to guide 
the management of engineering designs, showing the implications of this for investment 
choices (e.g. how much relational investment should be undertaken). This is important, since, 
as previously noted, engineering work is becoming increasingly innovative, complex and 
collaborative. The model also offers more specific guidance for the types of investments within 
project contexts, where site teams are typically created and dismantled for one-off situations, 
so are different to prevailing business transactions that are accommodated more sufficiently by 
the theoretical frames. Finally, the model brings together related, but distinct concepts for 
engineering and construction procurement, synthesising different theoretical elements to offer 
new insights, and potential choices. The transitions offer novel approaches to challenge or 
guide existing practices.  
V. Conclusions 
At the outset, this paper aimed to describe the underlying characteristics of the engineering 
design investments undertaken and then prescribe the relational investment and contract forms 
required to maximize the chance of project success. We designed an empirical study to 
investigate the above aims and research issues with complex engineering projects as the 
research setting. This informed two phases: a descriptive and then prescriptive model 
development phases.  The descriptive model characterises the types of investments made in 
different engineering designs with a focus on explaining the relational investments made across 
the case studies. Using indicators of cost, time and quality, the results of the empirical work 
show as planned performance outcomes for solutions based on off-the-shelf design with Fixed 
Price mechanisms, positive performance outcomes for solutions based on adaptive designs with 
target costs mechanisms, as well as bespoke solutions contracted on a Fixed Price basis. 
Negative performance outcomes were found for adaptive solutions with Fixed Price 
mechanisms and mixed results with cost reimbursement mechanisms. Relational initiatives, in 
terms of the strength and duration, likely play a moderating role in the above outcomes.   
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The prescriptive model builds on the previous phases, and supports decision making for 
different engineering design environments. It is intended to inform the choice of an appropriate 
strategy and structure for the nature of the products and services sought, and the long -term 
character of the relationship. It can inform different procurement approaches, including 
providing a rationale for when occasional supply contracts, long term supply contracts, project 
partnering and bite size research contracts may be appropriate. The model gives guidance 
frontiers to indicate the contract types that may or may not be suitable for the different areas of 
the model, as well as three transitions to challenge current practice and guide choices. In doing 
so, the paper contributes to a more systematic understanding of appropriate procurement 
approach in construction engineering. In particular, we develop knowledge related to TCE with 
respect to the types of specific investments made in different engineering design environments, 
and the digital assets that underpin those investments.  
There are a number of implications for the management of engineering. First, there is the issue 
of how to procure innovative R&D engineering work. The model offers two different models 
for this. First, there is the option to undertake bite size R&D. In this case a client may choose 
to separate complex work into a number of distinct phases, and offer lump sum contracts for 
each. Alternatively, a client can procure R&D on a re-imbursement contract in the pioneer 
project space. The buyer and supplier would have to work closely to understand the problem, 
and the potential solutions. This would depend on the risk appetite and expertise of the client, 
as well as the nature of the problem, and the strength of the supply market. Then there is the 
issue of procuring solutions from existing designs. This may be done on a very transactional 
basis on a priced basis, with little relational commitment. Alternatively, if the work contributes 
to a long term pipeline of work, then it may be possible to justify longer term relational 
investments based on the promise of performance gains over time.  The study also underlines 
to practitioners the important role of relational investments (which come at a cost) and the need 
for them to be tailored to the types of engineering being undertaken. 
The insights and findings may be used by organisations to form a strategic justification and 
holistic approach, as well as a starting point for the planning of relational initiatives and 
investments. It provides an intellectual structure to establish the appropriate collaborative 
climate and incentivization through their contracting practices. Ideally, the engineering design 
category is identified early, there is early engagement between client and contractor, and then 
there are safeguards and processes in place to ensure that organisations stay connected in the 
right way over the exchange. The main limitation of the study is the ability to generalise. This 
is exploratory research, developed within the context of infrastructure projects, which we hope 
is repeated, reviewed and evaluated by subsequent studies. Further work is needed to extend 
the work beyond this context and establish the validity of the prescriptive model. The 
categories, zones, frontiers and transitions within the model represent somewhat idealised 
forms. In reality, it is likely that the zone boundaries are fuzzier than displayed in our model. 
It may also be possible that a reimbursable contract could be employed with loose relational 
linkages, if there is trust in professional credentials and reputation. Finally, we have focused 
on engineering design as a basis for decision making, but there may be a range of other factors, 
such as business planning, environmental factors, and health and safety, which may form the 
basis for project delivery structures. The transitions highlighted in the prescriptive model also 
require further research to test, substantiate, and better understand how they may be realised. 
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